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Introduction 
The wide semantic scope of “mind” in Modern English extends through history to 
a culture with both linguistic and cultural similarities to our own: early-medieval, or 
Anglo-Saxon, England. Old English contains many references that conflate the different 
possible qualities of the mind. Emotions can heat the mind into passion; the soul can 
inhabit the mind‟s enclosure; reason can control the passionate mind.  Indeed, as many 
scholars have noted, the “remarkably rich” lexicon in Old English of terms denoting the 
“mind” and its functions demonstrates the conceit‟s cultural importance. 1  The full 
vocabulary for the mind is even more significant in the context of linguistic studies 
arguing that “every language suggests its own categorization and its own interpretation 
for the world” through its individual “set of lexicalized components.”2 Thus, the abundant 
vocabulary for the mind in Old English indicates the cultural perceptions of the Anglo-
Saxons. Because of its very fullness, however, this vocabulary can be confusing to 
modern readers. 
The poet of The Wanderer, for example, uses a well attested idiom localizing 
one‟s thoughts in the ferðlocan (stronghold of the mind) or hordcofan (chamber of 
treasure). Along the same lines, Ælfric, though he almost certainly understood it as 
metaphor, suggests in places that the mind has distinct spatial dimensions differing from 
person to person. This confusion has led some scholars to attempt an awkward conflation 
of different perceptions of thought. Peter Clemoes represents this group of scholars, 
contending that The Wanderer and The Seafarer are in “harmony” with the patristic 
                                                 
1
 Soon-Ai Low, “Vocabulary for „Mind,” p. 11. See also Antonina Harbus, The Life of the Mind, p. 21.  
2
 Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics, Culture, and Cognition, p. 20. 
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writings.
3
 With what has since become a standard study in the field, Malcolm Godden has 
effectively changed the prevailing scholarly opinion by stating that “two distinct 
traditions of thought about the mind are evident among the Anglo-Saxons.”4 There is, 
according to Godden, a classical tradition and a vernacular tradition of Anglo-Saxon 
psychology. The two traditions diverge in the way they treat thoughts and the mind. With 
Godden‟s division of these two traditions, a new context has been created for the 
consideration of questions about the mind and thought in Anglo-Saxon literature. The 
status of scholarship at this time seems clear. What is not clear, however, is where to go 
from this point. The different models proposed by Godden, for instance, have wide 
ranging implications for the ethics surrounding wisdom‟s use. Ideas of holding, sharing, 
and teaching differ between each tradition and within the traditions themselves. Yet, the 
cultural logic governing the mental exchange of wisdom is seldom examined in either 
tradition.  
Among the complex writings that have survived from early-medieval England are 
differing and even opposing views about the acceptability of exchanging wisdom. Yet, 
the sources do more than simply disagree. The surviving works unfold the story of a 
struggle for control of the ethics governing wisdom‟s exchange waged between the 
vernacular and Latinate traditions. Here the local wise men battle the clergy for cultural 
dominance while a more moderate strain of the Latinate tradition combines elements of 
both systems of belief. The focus of this study is the examination of the vernacular, 
moderate Latinate, and ecclesiastical Latinate traditions as they oppose and, in some 
cases, agree with one another. Just as revealing as the conflicts between the three 
                                                 
3
 Peter Clemoes, “Mens absentia cogitans,” p. 70. 
4
 Malcolm R. Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," p. 271. 
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traditions are the common beliefs they hold in spite of their differences, beliefs that point 
to deeply held opinions about the basic nature of wisdom and thought itself. Of course, as 
the division of “Latinate” into the “moderate Latinate” and “ecclesiastical Latinate” 
reveals, labels such as “vernacular” and “Latinate” are reductive. Since, however, they do 
provide a framework for discussion, these labels can be useful if their limitations are not 
forgotten. It is also very tempting to impose a diachronic explanation on these differing 
strains of tradition. With the difficulty of dating manuscripts and the uncertainties of 
authorship, this temptation must be resisted. As will be seen, simply because some of the 
works in the final section on the ecclesiastical tradition may come after other texts 
examined does not mean that they represent the definitive Anglo-Saxon opinion of 
wisdom‟s use. A synchronic viewpoint must here carry the day since it is far more likely 
that these traditions coexisted in contact and conflict for many years. Even today the 
conflicts generated hundreds of years ago remain unsolved.  
Still a contentious word, “mind” stores the various meanings imparted to it by 
generations.  It is this confusion about the function of the mind that an examination of 
Anglo-Saxon literature will serve to illuminate. The Anglo-Saxons held a complex and 
multifaceted concept of the mind centrally important in their literature. Many of the 
complex workings of the mind they perceived appear to have survived into modern 
English. In frozen idioms and popular use, the mind performs a huge range of functions 
today just as it did in early-medieval England. Thus, an examination of Anglo-Saxon 
literature provides a lens through which modern western assumptions about the mind and 
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thought can be exposed and observed. Using Anglo-Saxon literature, yesterday‟s culture 
becomes today‟s cultural microscope.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 All translations of the texts examined below are my own unless otherwise noted. Where beneficial, I have 
silently added punctuation and expanded abbreviations. All biblical quotations are from Weber‟s edition of 
the Latin Vulgate Bible. Translations from the Vulgate were made in consultation with the Douay-Rheims 
translation (Challoner‟s Revision). Similarly, all translations from the Pastoral Care were made in 
consultation with Henry Sweet‟s translation.  
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The “Vernacular” Tradition: 
The Dialogues, Arguments, and Lessons of Wisdom  
When working with a corpus as large and fluid as Old English wisdom literature, 
any generalizations will inevitably prove inadequate. Such statements will, almost by 
definition, fail to capture the complexity and subtlety inherent in cultural beliefs. It is, 
however, often helpful when discussing the works of such an amorphous body of 
literature to sketch a tentative outline. Then to facilitate discussion I propose three basic 
types of wisdom exchange: genial, disputational, and didactic. Each of these is 
represented respectively by Maxims I, The Second Dialogue of Solomon and Saturn and 
The Prose Solomon and Saturn, and Precepts. Together, these three texts represent 
instances of a culturally permissible movement of wisdom from one person to another. 
The genial exchange of wisdom is characterized by comparatively friendly give 
and take discussion of wisdom.
6
 During this type of interaction the parties involved 
appear to be working in a cooperative way to mutually increase their wisdom through 
discussion with another wise person. The opening lines of Maxims I depict the beginning 
of one such exchange: 
 Frige mec frodum wordum.  Ne læt þinne ferð onhælne, 
degol þæt þu deopost cunne.  Nelle ic þe min dyrne gesecgan, 
gif þu me þinne hygecræft hylest    ond þine heortan geþohtas. 
Gleawe men sceolon gieddum wrixlan.
7
 
                                                 
6
 Hansen, The Solomon Complex, p. 158 links the exchange in Maxims I with The Second Dialogue of 
Solomon and Saturn labeling them both as contests. While there could, in any exchange between humans, 
be some element of contest I differ from her interpretation here since Maxims I does not show the emphasis 
on verbs of confrontation that characterizes The Second Dialogue of Solomon and Saturn, examined below.     
7
 Maxims I, ed. Dobbie and Krapp, pp. 156-175, lines 1-4a: “Ask of me with wise words. Do not let your 
mind be concealed, that which you most deeply know stay hidden. I will not tell you my secret if you hide 
your wisdom and the thoughts of your heart from me. Wise men should exchange proverbs.” Translations 
from Maxims I made in consultation with Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, p. 64.  
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Though only four lines of text, this opening encodes an abundance of information. It is 
clear from the outset that this interaction is necessarily mutual; unless his sharing is 
reciprocated, the poet, who casts himself here as a wise man, will not share his 
knowledge. It is also clear, as Elaine Tuttle Hansen notes, from the concluding maxim, 
“gleawe men sceolon gieddum wrixlan” (wise men should exchange proverbs), that the 
“proposed exchange of gied accords with a universal ethical norm.”8 Of course, this 
exchange is not ethically acceptable when conducted with any random person but only 
with “geleawe men” (wise men) such as the poet and his fictional interlocutor. It appears 
then, that these wise men form a specialist, almost cultish, group in control of wisdom. 
Indeed the use of “degol” and “dyrne” gives wisdom the cast of primitive magic: “by this 
view, wisdom—closer, as in Babylonia, to cult—excludes the uninitiated and involves 
mysteries, secrets, and powers shared, warily but urgently, by a privileged few.”9 Indeed, 
a few lines later the idea of a learned elite is reinforced: 
            Þing sceal gehegan 
 frod wiþ frodne.    Biþ hyra ferð gelic. 
 Hi a sace semaþ,    sibbe gelærað, 
 þa ær wonsælge    awegen habbað. 
Ræd sceal mid snyttro,    ryht mid wisum, 
 til sceal mid tilum.
10
  
 
It is explicitly stated in this passage that wise men should be with wise men. Their minds 
are alike and, presumably, they will advise the same thing. It is as if a person with 
                                                 
8
 Hansen, The Solomon Complex, p. 160. It will also be helpful to note here that the working definition of a 
maxim or gnome used in this paper comes from Cavill, Maxims in Old English Poetry, pp. 50-52. By 
Cavill‟s description, the defining features of a gnome or maxim are: the elements of a complete sentence, 
superlatives—when used—lacking an explicit base of comparison, a present tense main verb, a subject that 
is not a specific person, and no deictic reference to a specific situation. 
9
 Ibid., p. 159. 
10
 Maxims I, ed. Dobbie and Krapp, pp. 156-175, lines 18b-23a: “A wise man should hold meetings with 
another wise man. Their minds are alike. They always settle disputes and advise for peace, which 
unfortunate men have previously disturbed. Good advice goes with wisdom, justice with a wise man, a 
good man should be with good.”  
                                                                                                                                 Webb 8 
sufficient wisdom will always reach the abstractly “good” conclusion. At this point, then, 
there seems to be a firmly established group who control wisdom, an elite of the wise. It 
is not long, though, until this orderly system is disrupted.  
 In the third section of the poem, the brotherhood of the wise is cast down from its 
lofty position. No longer is there a unified group in control of thought. In place of an 
oligarchy of wisdom rises a democracy: 
Wæra gewylcum wislicu    word gerisað, 
gleomen gied    ond guman snyttro. 
Swa manige beoþ men ofer eorþan,    swa beoþ modgeþoncas; 
ælc him hafað sundoersefan.
11
  
 
Both the authority of the wise elite and the unity of mind seen before appear dashed by 
this passage. Wisdom is good for everyone and each of those people has a mind of his 
own. Though this passage seems to pose an insurmountable problem to the conceit of a 
small group of wise men controlling wisdom, a look at the larger work and its possible 
intention transforms this perceived contradiction into a fine distinction.  
 Though scholars have increasingly begun to acknowledge the value of Maxims I, 
they often remain hesitant to offer an explanation of the poem‟s overall purpose. Paul 
Cavill states that the purpose was to collect, arrange, and elaborate “miscellaneous 
sayings because they were valuable and interesting in themselves” and because they are 
educational, reflecting a “common store of knowledge which the Anglo-Saxon would 
take for granted.”12 Carolyne Larrington poses the idea that Maxims I depicts a 
“reassuring picture” of social and natural order which, while partially accurate, seems 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., lines 165-168: “Wise words are fitting for everybody, a song for the minstrel, and prudence for a 
man. There are as many opinions as there are men on the earth; everyone has a mind of his own.” 
Translation Shippey‟s.  
12
 Cavill, Maxims in Old English Poetry, p. 185. 
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wanting in light of the poem‟s length and ideological breadth.13 Hansen comes closest to 
a satisfying explanation arguing that “the gnomic poem as a whole foregrounds the 
contextuality of meaning throughout” and reminds “us that the meaning of general truth 
resides in its local application.”14 It is this final sense of purpose for Maxims I that I wish 
to elaborate. Rather than representing Cavill‟s list or Larrington‟s order, the individual 
maxims of the poem represent bits of knowledge applicable to a multiplicity of situations 
and necessarily subject to elaboration. For this I briefly turn to a cognitive approach to 
understanding proverbs.  
 According to Richard P. Honeck, the Extended Conceptual Base Theory explains 
that humans understand proverbs in predictable steps.
15
 When a proverb is given a person 
first constructs a literal meaning, moves on to devise a figurative meaning, and then 
applies that figurative meaning to either a current or new situation. One example used to 
illustrate this point is the proverb “not every oyster contains a pearl.”16 On the literal level 
it is understood that oysters make pearls, something valuable, but not always. The 
figurative meaning, then, is something close to “not everything that makes valuable 
things does it all the time.” This figurative meaning can then be applied to explain an 
immediate situation or help a person understand a novel future situation. As Honeck puts 
it, “almost any domain of reality in which normally productive processes fail to deliver 
becomes a candidate for the application of the oyster proverb.”17 In the way that a 
proverb can be applied to explain both past and future events it represents a kernel, or 
seed, of wisdom. When people use a proverb in a new context they effectively increase 
                                                 
13
 Larrington, A Store of Common Sense, p. 130. 
14
 Hansen, The Solomon Complex, p. 177. 
15
 Honeck, A Proverb in Mind, pp. 128-136. 
16
 Ibid., p. 130. 
17
 Ibid. pp. 130-131. 
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their wisdom by a two fold process: first, they allow themselves to understand the new 
situation in context of a previous one in which the moral or point has already been made 
clear; second, since the proverb will not exactly match the new situation, the proverb‟s 
meaning will have to be revised and semantically expanded. An individual proverb is, 
then, less about itself than about its application to different situations. Hansen captures 
something close to this idea when she states that “these works [wisdom literature] 
demand and characterize an audience that takes a productive part in the interpretive 
process.”18 Though her insights are revealing, Hansen fails to make the final step and 
argue that the intention of a work such as Maxims I is to provoke thought, instigate the 
production of wisdom through the expansion of culturally relevant maxims functioning 
just as Honeck‟s proverbs. The perceived blankness of factual statements in Maxims I 
(and Maxims II for that matter) so long derided by early critics is also explained by the 
Extended Conceptual Base Theory.
19
 
 Proverbs tread in the realm of black and white. They describe things that are best 
and worst, things that must be and things that must not be. They represent a society‟s 
ideals and these ideals, by their nature, rest at the extremes.
20
 The maxim “Þing sceal 
gehegan // frod wiþ frodne” (one wise man should hold meetings with another) represents 
an ideal state. Such an apparently blunt pronouncement, once abstracted, can raise more 
questions than it answers. Do only wise men meet together or does this mean that if men 
hold meetings together they are wise? Is the implication here that consensus is valued 
                                                 
18
 Hansen, The Solomon Complex, p. 156.  
19
 For two examples of  these numerous early critics see Blanch Williams, Gnomic Poetry in Anglo-Saxon. 
New York: Columbia Univ. Press (1914): 85. and Margret Schlauch, English Medieval Literature and Its 
Social Foundations. Warsaw: Panstowe Wydawnictwo Navkowe (1956): 12.  
20
 Honeck, A Proverb in Mind, pp. 138-139. 
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more than an individual‟s choice?21  The vagaries of this seemingly blunt statement are 
exactly the point of the poem. A parallel exists in Sun Tzu‟s The Art of War. As a glance 
at any critical edition of the work shows, the short and often cryptic statements of this 
text have generated centuries of commentary. Though dedicated students of The Art of 
War may have memorized the statements themselves, it is from the elaboration, the 
discussion and commentary on the work, that deep and valuable wisdom grows. Simply 
reading the book is not enough. I would argue that wisdom literature such as Maxims I 
has a similar intention. The broad statements are intended to provoke the discussion 
which generates true wisdom rather than stand for that wisdom alone.
22
  
 With texts such as Maxims I resting as the seeds of wisdom, waiting only to be 
cultivated, the question of a learned elite in control of wisdom comes once more to the 
fore. After all, it would stand to reason that a work such as Maxims I was, at least at one 
point, performed orally, giving all listeners access to the secret knowledge. If everyone is 
included in this system of wisdom acquisition then there could be no specific group in 
control. This, however, is not necessarily true. Learning the most basic level of wisdom, 
the sayings in Maxims I, does not initiate a person into the circle of the wise. Instead, it is 
the commentary, the elaboration and expansion upon these basic maxims, that represents 
the wisdom controlled by the elite who were described at the beginning of the poem. 
                                                 
21
 See Robinson, “Artful Ambiguities,” for discussion of the idea that Anglo-Saxon poets would exploit 
ambiguities to cast multiple meanings simultaneously. Though his study is limited in scope, the conceptual 
principal is very close to what I am arguing here: one seemingly simple line of text can support multiple 
interpretations.  
22
 Shippey, “Maxims in Old English Narrative,” p. 42. Though he does an exemplary job in advocating the 
value of Anglo-Saxon maxims, I must differ from his opinion that maxims, as depictions of the society‟s 
common beliefs, are “not meant to be verified or criticized.” On the literal interpretation of a maxim this 
may possibly be true. Once, however, the meaning of a maxim has been abstracted and applied to a new 
situation the accuracy of the comparison and the implied expansion of the maxim‟s meaning would both be 
open for debate.  
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Basic wisdom is, as the poet says, “fitting for everybody.” The thoughts of “gelawe men” 
(wise men) are the secrets, the esoteric domain, of wisdom‟s controllers.  
 While the specialist group of wise men appears capable of calm discussion in 
order to increase their wisdom, the genial exchange is by no means the only one 
illustrated in the literature. The Second Dialogue of Solomon and Saturn, peppered with 
verbs of contention and hostile debate, stands as a prime example of a disputational 
exchange. In setting the stage, the opening lines of the poem reveal much of the work‟s 
overall emphasis:  
Hwæt, ic flitan gefrægn     on fyrndagum 
 modgleawe men,    middangeardes ræswan, 
 gewesan ymb hira wisdom.    Wyrs deð se ðe liehð 
 oððe ðæs soðes ansæceð.    Saloman was bremra, 
ðeah ðe Saturnus    sumra hæfde, 
bald breosttoga,    boca cæga, 
leornenga locan.
23
 
 
One of the most striking features of these lines is the poet‟s specific choice of verbs 
signifying an engagement that is, in comparison to Maxims I, quite hostile.
24
 Within the 
first line, the verb “flitan,” especially in conjunction with a prepositional phrase 
beginning with “ymb,” places the speech between Solomon and Saturn firmly in the 
realm of debate as the two “dispute” each other‟s knowledge.25 The next verb in the 
sentence, “gewesan,” meaning to “converse” or “discuss,” implies an active engagement 
                                                 
23
 Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, p. 87, lines 1-7a: “Listen, I heard of a dispute held in the days 
of old by wise-minded men, leaders of the world, debating concerning their wisdom. He does worse who 
lies or denies the truth. Solomon was more famous, though Saturn, bold chieftain, held the keys to some 
books, the enclosures of learning.”  
24
 Larrington, A Store of Common Sense, p. 156 suggests that the dialogue form seen in the poem is “to be 
related to Latin models rather than the Germanic wisdom contest.” If that is so then it seems that the Anglo-
Saxon poet has added what is potentially a culturally specific perception of wisdom debate by changing the 
relatively neutral verbs of Latin dialogues to verbs signifying contention.   
25
 Dictionary of Old English, s.v. flitan, sense A.2.a.  “Indicating a matter disputed. . . . with prepositional 
phrase introduced by be/ymb „concerning.‟” 
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with wisdom rather than the almost passive sharing in Maxims I.
 26
 Instead of a simple 
exchange of precepts, here knowledge is being questioned and examined. Nor is this 
example without support from the rest of the work. Later Saturn makes a statement which 
indicates an implicit understanding that the natural action for wise men was the 
discussion of wisdom: 
 Full oft ic frode menn    fyrn gehyrde 
 secggan and swerian    ymb sume wisan:  
. . .  
 Ic to soðon wat—    sægdon me geara 
 Filistina witan,    ðonne we on geflitum sæton, 
 bocum tobræddon    and on bearm legdon, 
 meðelcwidas mengdon,    moniges fengon.
27
  
 
The first two lines establish that discussion and assertion about philosophical topics is a 
common occurrence—here the assertions happen to concern the strength of fated events 
in comparison with foresight. A few lines latter the poet moves from the general 
declaration that men often discuss “certain matters,” to a specific example of debate. In 
this example, the Philistine counselors, the “witan” of wise men, dispute thought about 
“many matters” with Saturn. “Flitan” is again used in this passage indicating that the 
action between Solomon and Saturn was much the same as that between Saturn and the 
Philistines. From this assumed homogeneity of interaction between wise men arises the 
intimation that, at least to this poet, arguing about wisdom is one acceptable activity for 
knowledgeable men. 
Moving from the micro to macro level, the form of the work itself suggests a 
struggle between two minds. Many of the individual questions asked by Saturn are 
                                                 
26
 An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Bosworth et al., s.v. gewesan, “I. to be together, converse, debate. . .” 
27
 Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, p. 98, lines 247-248 and 252-255:”Very often in the past I 
have heard men of experience talking and making assertions about a certain matter”. . . “I know this is 
true— the Philistine counselors told me in the past when we sat disputing, opening books and putting them 
in our laps, exchanging speeches and taking up many matters.” Translation Shippey‟s.  
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reminiscent of a riddle contest in which, between two individuals, each would test the 
other‟s knowledge of existing riddles and ability to analyze new material. A large number 
of the questions are composed of clues to an answer with one ending in “saga hwæt ic 
mæne” (say what I mean).28 While this ending is aberrant, it provides a firm bridge from 
the common structure of Saturn‟s questions to some riddles found in The Exeter Book 
which end in very similar constructions.
29
 In this way each question posed represents an 
individual point of dispute.  
Though departing from the overtly combative form of The Second Dialogue of 
Solomon and Saturn, a related work, The Prose Solomon and Saturn, reiterates the focus 
on confrontational engagement over wisdom. The poem flatly states that: “her kið hu 
saturnus and Saloman fettode ymbe heora wisdom.”30 Once more a verb denoting 
contention, “fettode,” is chosen to describe the interaction exhibited in the text.31 Rare 
though this verb is, its formulaic pairing with “ymb heora wisdom,” as marked before 
with “flitan,” draws similarity between the two works and further marks “fettian” as a 
verb of dispute. In this way, The Prose Solomon and Saturn, while it reads much more 
like an extended question and answer session, lends support to the premise extended in 
The Second Dialogue of Solomon and Saturn that argument is one format of wisdom 
exchange between wise men. As Hansen puts it, “in an exchange between two who are 
truly verbally skilled and hence wise, both can be winners.”32 Through the process of 
discussion the knowledge of both men grows. This idea of mutually increasing 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., p. 88, line 59.  
29
 Specifically see the endings of riddles 61, 62, 80, 83, and 86, ed. Dobbie and Krapp, pp. 229-238. 
30
 Cross and Hill, Prose Solomon and Saturn, p. 25: “here it makes known how Saturn and Solomon 
disputed concerning their wisdom.” 
31
 Dictionary of Old English, s.v. fettian, “to contend, strive.” Though this verb occurs only once in the Old 
English corpus it is linked to the noun s.v. fitt, “fight, conflict, struggle, battle,” which places the definition 
on firm ground.  
32
 Hansen, The Solomon Complex, p. 152. 
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knowledge links back to the concept that wisdom arises from discussion. There are, 
however, some problems depicting either exchange between Solomon and Saturn in the 
same role as Maxims I, serving as a base for elaboration.  
Some of the comments are indeed far too specific to perform the function of an 
abstracted maxim. One notable example occurs early in The Prose Solomon and Saturn 
when Saturn asks how tall Adam was when he was created.
33
 The extremely specific 
nature of these comments, which compose the bulk of the poem, makes it difficult to 
argue that this work is intended to provoke discussion. Instead, it suggests that one facet 
of wisdom was knowing these esoteric facts. Perhaps these were entry level questions and 
answers that could help establish a person‟s status as a wise man. In a culture where 
wisdom was closely guarded, these questions and answers, or a recitation of them, may 
have acted as passwords. The Second Dialogue of Solomon and Saturn presents an even 
trickier problem since it contains maxims and many of its passages are in something like 
riddle form. Indeed, where Solomon is not answering Saturn‟s riddles the two slip into 
exchanges of maxims. On one occasion the two are discussing the same event, doomsday, 
and applying different maxims to it.
 34
 This is a model for the semantic expansion of 
maxims. Solomon, for example, says that “lytle hwile / leaf beoð grene” (leaves are green 
for a short time) when talking about doomsday.
35
 He then goes onto explicate the use of 
this maxim, stating that those who have been committing crimes fall just as leaves when 
they die. The abstract meaning here seems to be that apparently good things, green 
leaves, will die and fall. That is, eventually all things will die and then be judged. This 
                                                 
33
 Cross and Hill, Prose Solomon and Saturn, p. 27. “Saga me hu lang wæs adam on længe geseapen. Ic ðe 
secge, he wæs vi and cx ynca lang” : “Tell me how tall Adam was created in height. I tell you, he was one 
hundred and sixteen inches tall.” Translation Cross and Hill‟s.  
34
 Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, p. 92, lines 131- 156. 
35
 Ibid., line 136. 
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work is perhaps a model of discussion between two wise men. We see them exchange 
some of the passwords to knowledge in riddle form and then watch the abstraction and 
expansion of specific maxims to fit a situation that appears different than the one in 
which they were composed. 
Though Maxims I and the engagements between Solomon and Saturn stand as 
examples of different types of wisdom exchange, they display a remarkably similar 
concern with the status of the participants. It appears that whether discussing wisdom in a 
genial exchange or contesting it in a disputational one, both parties should be wise. In 
Maxims I the “gleawe men” (wise men) discuss the fine points of wisdom. The Second 
Dialogue of Solomon and Saturn is even more specific, providing a short history of 
Saturn in order to give him a status nearly equivalent to Solomon: 
       Saloman wæs bremra, 
ðeah ðe Saturnus    sumra hæfde, 
bald breosttoga,    boca cæga, 
leornenga locan.
36
 
 
Because Solomon has the greater reputation, much pain is taken to establish Saturn as a 
worthy interlocutor.
37
 References both to Saturn‟s books and his extensive travels 
indicate that he is experienced and knowledgeable. The repeated emphasis on status 
points again to a specialist group in possession of higher knowledge and with control 
                                                 
36
Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, p. 87, lines 4b-7a: “Solomon was more famous, though Saturn, 
bold chieftain, held the keys to some books, the enclosures of learning.” Translation made in consultation 
with Shippey‟s. A lengthy list of countries visited by Saturn follows this sentence in what presumably 
represents a further attempt to bolster Saturn‟s status by demonstrating his great experience. Shippey, 
Poems of Wisdom and Learning, p. 136, in reference to the status of Solomon and Saturn, makes note that 
“breosttoga” “is an unusual compound.” He states that, “the word, like „ræswan,‟ seems chosen to show 
that, though the disputants are eminent men, they are not so in a simply military way.” The overtones of 
“ræswan” may also be examined. An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Bosworth et al., s.v.: “I. a counselor. . .  II. 
one who takes thought (for the public good), (a) a prince, king. . . (b) a leading man, chief person, leader.” 
These are all people who would have discussed and debated issues either with other “counselors” or, in the 
case of a leader or king, with a “witan.” Though lacking the dramatic impact on the passage possessed by 
the verbs, this vocabulary choice reinforces the overall theme of the piece. 
37
 Hansen, The Solomon Complex, p. 150 supports the idea that Solomon and Saturn are contenders because 
of the comparatives used to describe them. Solomon is “bremra” (more famous). 
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over wisdom.
 38
 These cases, however, provide only for interactions between those 
already established as sufficiently learned. Since humans do not spring up endowed with 
knowledge and experience, at some point they must be taught. 
 One of the clearest pedagogical manifestos, and the first example of didactic 
wisdom exchange, occurs late in the first section of Maxims I. This clarity is, however, 
relative; the passage maintains an ample amount of the thought provoking vagueness of 
Old English wisdom literature. Much depth is implied in the poet‟s words as he sketches 
stages of the teaching process: 
    Læran sceal mon geongne monnan, 
 trymman ond tyhtan    þæt he teala cunne, 
 oþþæt hine mon atemedne hæbbe; 
 sylle him wist ond wædo,    oþþæt hine mon on gewitte alæde. 
 Ne sceal hine mon cildgeongne forcweþan,    ær he hine acyþan mote; 
 þy sceal on þeode geþeon,    þæt he wese þristhycgende. 
 Styran sceal man strongum mode.
39
 
 
The main focus of the passage is the conflict between nature and civilization.
40
 It seems 
that the process of teaching a young man culminates when he becomes “atemedne” 
(disciplined). The semantic range of this specific verb extends beyond meaning to 
“subdue” or “discipline” a person, encompassing the “taming” or “training” of a wild 
                                                 
38
 Wise advice and counsel was not intended solely for the minds of the wise. The Second Dialogue of 
Solomon and Saturn ( Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, pp. 100-103, lines  312-319) sets the good 
advice of a man‟s relatives against evil and temptation. Since evil and temptation are bad, in this context 
wisdom is good for all men. Maxims I (ed. Dobbie and Krapp, p. 160, lines 118b-119b) similarly states that 
“wisdom is the most useful thing, evil the least.” Thus, the idea is not that only wise men can wield wisdom 
but that a specific subset of knowledgeable men is responsible for the growth, exchange, and debate of 
wisdom. 
39
 Maxims I, ed. Dobbie and Krapp, p.158, lines 45b-50a: “One should teach a young man, strengthen and 
persuade him so that he knows things well, until one has disciplined him. Give him food and clothes until 
one has conducted him into knowledge. One should not reject the young child before he may show his 
nature. Thus shall he thrive among the people, become bold minded. One must check a strong mind.” 
40
 Though a very learned article, I can not agree with O‟Camb, “Bishop Æthelwold and Shaping” that this 
passage from Maxims I represents a Benedictine reform view of child education. While there are some 
lexical similarities between Maxims I and Æthelwold‟s translation of the Benedictine Rule, the poem also 
shares lexical similarities with elegies and other vernacular works. As a whole, the passage has too many 
connections to other literature, connections that O‟Camb rightly notes, to read it as exclusively Benedictine. 
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animal.
41
 This verb connotes that much more is occurring in these lines than is explicitly 
stated. There is an implication that the young man‟s mind was wild or uncontrolled 
before it was instructed.
42
 Rather than allow the mind to remain in an uncultivated state, 
the teacher is responsible for leading the pupil to knowledge. Like “atemedne,” the verb 
used in this passage for leading, “alædan,” contains a much fuller meaning than provided 
by any single word gloss. More specifically, this verb refers to guiding a person‟s “mind, 
thoughts, or habits.”43 Overall this passage appears to depict a teaching process in which 
the instructor takes control of and then forms the student‟s mind. The thoughts of the 
young man are shaped. There is a hint of warning, developed more in vernacular elegiac 
poetry, that an excessively strong mind must be controlled. 
44
 Here, however, it is the 
“bold minded” product of instruction that thrives among his people. 
 Many of the characteristic elements of teaching evident in the passage from 
Maxims I appear in another heavily didactic poem, Precepts. Praise for a bold mind, for 
example, is inherent in the advice of the experienced father of Precepts instructing his 
son. Many of the actions that the father urges would require great strength of mind. 
Avoiding anger, spite, a woman‟s love, and recognizing good and evil—all things the 
father enjoins—are not easy tasks. Moreover, the wise father‟s instruction of his son, who 
                                                 
41
 Dictionary of Old English, s.v. atemian, sense 1. “to tame, train (an animal or bird)” and sense 2. “to 
subdue, discipline (someone/something acc.).”  
42
 Larrington, A Store of Common Sense, p. 124 also notes the “implied comparison between the young man 
and a young animal who must be tamed” but calls the tone of the passage “light and affectionate” and does 
not examine the implications of an untamed mind.  
43
 Dictionary of Old English, s.v. alædan, sense 1.a.v. “referring to the guiding of someone‟s mind, 
thoughts, habits: alædan of / on „to guide (someone) out of / into.‟” 
44
 Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, p. 131 mentions the dispute over this half line, “styran sceal 
man strongum mode,” which is repeated almost verbatim in line 109a of The Seafarer. Some take it to 
mean “a man must rule with a strong mind” rather than “a strong mind must be checked” as Shippey 
translates it. Since Bosworth-Toller indicates that “styran” takes the dative, there seems little reason for 
such a debate. Shippey‟s translation appears to be the most accurate. O‟Camb, “Bishop Æthelwold and 
Shaping,” p. 263 also contains discussion focused of this half line. He, however, uses it to link Maxims I 
with chapter thirty of the Old English Benedictine Rule, omitting in his extended discussion of the half line, 
though having previously noted it, the almost verbatim reproduction of the half line in The Seafarer. 
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does not reply throughout the piece, mirrors the unidirectional movement of wisdom 
from instructor to student in the passage on teaching from Maxims I. The father 
repeatedly gives advice without pause for interruption. Great as these similarities are, the 
most revealing details lie in the differences between the two poems. 
 Where as Maxims I blandly states that a youth should be given time in which to 
prove himself, Precepts appears to posit some ways that a young man may actually use 
wisdom to demonstrate his worth. Within this ninety-four line poem, wisdom is explicitly 
linked to verbal control twice. Over the work‟s course the father delivers ten individual 
sections of what he considers the most important advice. It is highly significant, then, that 
in two of these cases the theme of moderating wisdom is present. Both times wisdom 
prevents foolish or improper speech: 
       Wes þu a giedda wis, 
 wær wið willan,    worda hyrde 
. . . .  
 Wærwyrd sceal    wisfæst hæle 
 breostum hycgan,    nales breahtme hlud.
45
 
 
In the first instance “worda hyrde” (guard your words) is in apposition to the command 
“Wes þu a giedda wis” (always be wise in what you say). This apposition implies that a 
wise person necessarily guards his words. The second instance is straightforward. Wise 
men are careful with their words; they do not heedlessly spew them forth. They deliberate 
before speaking their minds since unpremeditated thought can be “loud and noisy,” an 
outcome that is “nales” (not at all) desirable. Here, wisdom plays a moderating role to the 
feelings by keeping potential outbursts contained. The implication from this passage is 
                                                 
45
 Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, pp. 48-50, lines 41a-42b and 57a-58b: “Always be wise in 
what you say, watchful against desires; guard your words”. . . . “A wise man must be careful with his 
words, and think things over in his heart, not be loud and noisy.” The parallel of the second sentence to The 
Metrical Epilogue to the Pastoral Care is notable and examined later. 
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that a young man will be thought well of if he is able to control his words. Much better 
than emotional eruptions are the thoughtful exchanges of information from Maxims I or 
the debates from The Dialogue of Solomon and Saturn. The advice that these works give, 
though, must be viewed in context of their overall function. 
 Maxims I, as seen above, is composed of many seeds of wisdom that require 
elaboration to reach their full potential for instruction. Though the preceding section from 
Maxims I sketches some guidelines for education, there is no reason to suppose that these 
statements would not have been discussed and elaborated in a manner similar to other 
gnomic utterances. The poem states, for instance, that “one should teach a young man.” It 
does not, however, say exactly how this teaching should be conducted. Whether a youth 
will spend time in the classical schoolroom of St. Augustine‟s Confessions or take part in 
the imitative form of learning later used by some monasteries is left to be decided.
46
 The 
next didactic poem, Precepts, poses a different interpretive problem. While it is 
interspersed with maxims, the wise father takes an interpretive role—a role unparalleled 
in Maxims I. One instance of this explanatory action occurs in line 37 after the father has 
warned his son to avoid a litany of evil things including the love of women: 
 Forðon sceal æwiscmod    oft siþian, 
 se þe gewiteð    in wifes lufan, 
 fremdre meowlan.    Þær bið a firena wen, 
 laðlicre scome,    long nið wið god, 
 getende gielp. Wes þu a giedda wis, 
 wær wið willan, worda hyrde.
47
 
 
                                                 
46
 Cochelin, “Besides the book,” pp. 28-39 discusses the role of imitation used at the monastery of Cluny to 
train young boys for the brotherhood.   
47
 Shippey, Poems of Wisdom and Learning, pp. 48-49, lines 37-42: “For the man who falls to loving a 
woman, a girl he does not know, will often have to go away ashamed. One can always expect to find sin 
there, hateful disgrace, long enmity against God, and overflowing arrogance. Always be wise in what you 
say, watchful in your desires; guard your words.” Translation Shippey‟s.  
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Here we see advice expounded and clarified. You should not love a woman “forðon” 
(for) you will find shame. The advice is elaborated upon much in the way that a stand 
alone maxim would need to be so that its full meaning would become accessible. This 
appears to be a glimpse of the type of explication that a maxim could receive. Precepts 
can, then, be taken at something closer to its face value than a work as enigmatic as 
Maxims I. The seeds of wisdom are given in this work but here they are cultivated before 
the reader‟s eyes. Still, there is no reason to assume that this poem was meant to be 
memorized and accepted completely. Even after the explanations of the wise father in the 
poem, the lessons remain open to further discussion and clarification, which could go in 
any number of unpredictable ways. Clear as Precepts may be, its clarity is relative only in 
comparison to very obscure companions. It is, just as Maxims I, open to interpretation, 
elaboration, and semantic expansion through discussion.  
 In the end, none of these works can represent more than the first, second, or even 
third steppingstone on the long path to wisdom. They serve, each to a differing extent, as 
starting points for the elaboration of individual ideas into greater thought. While they can 
not be taken as the exact wisdom of the Anglo-Saxons, these poems do reveal some 
cultural beliefs. They indicate the importance of a select group of the super-wise in 
controlling and explicating wisdom, emphasize the importance of guarding wisdom itself, 
and display occasions when it is culturally permissible to share this tightly controlled 
wisdom. As noted above, making large generalizations about a diverse set of texts can 
lead to a poor understanding of both the works and the culture that produced them. The 
three categories of wisdom exchange suggested do, however, provide a framework for 
vernacular belief about the transmission of wisdom that enables further inquiry. Some of 
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the significant commonalities among the works composing the corpus of vernacular 
wisdom literature, for example, intrude into translations of Latin texts like Gregory the 
Great‟s Pastoral Care. Consequently, a qualified distillation of these similarities is useful 
in studying the larger corpus of Anglo-Saxon literature. With this goal in mind, three 
general patterns of wisdom transference appear represented in the literature: first is the 
sharing of knowledge depicted in Maxims I, the “genial exchange”; second is the 
confrontation between Solomon and Saturn, the “disputational exchange”; third is the 
unidirectional didacticism exemplified in part of Maxims I and Precepts, the “didactic 
exchange.” In both the genial and the disputational exchanges great care is taken to 
clarify that the parties involved are equal. This anxiety that all interlocutors be proven 
wise suggests a concern that only the wise members of an elite group control wisdom. 
Because of their skill, these wise men keep their knowledge within their fellowship, their 
“witan.” In some places concern for the control of wisdom nearly reaches an obsession. 
When the teacher subdues and guides his pupil‟s mind in Maxims I there is a sense of 
overriding control. More than representing a simple transfer of knowledge, the didactic 
exchange depicts the molding of the student‟s mental enclosure. Great consideration, it 
seems, is given to the security of any mental enclosure involved in the transfer of 
wisdom, whether giving or receiving. The cultural importance placed on this security is, 
in a large part, justified by the potential disaster of its failure. As The Metrical Epilogue 
to the Pastoral Care warns, a leaky vessel will spill knowledge, the drink of life, and 
condemn the wasteful person. 
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The “Latinate” Tradition I: 
The Moderate Control and Containment of Vernacular Wisdom 
Studied relatively little, the Old English translation of Gregory the Great‟s Regula 
pastoralis displays a revealing range of examples of mental containment and its logic. 
Two sections in particular show unique adaptations of the mental containment theme 
prevalent elsewhere in vernacular Anglo-Saxon literature: The Metrical Epilogue to the 
Pastoral Care refashions the stock theme of thought as treasure to stress the general 
importance of mental containment; conversely, a passage from the body of the Old 
English prose translation indicates circumstances in which it is ethically permissible to 
share thought. In spite of their different resolutions, the logic apparently underlying both 
situations demonstrates the same conclusion seen in the vernacular texts examined above: 
containment is the natural state of wisdom. Going beyond their vernacular influences, 
both The Metrical Epilogue and the prose section from the Pastoral Care refigure the 
traditional control of wisdom along hierarchical lines. Rather than the wise men from the 
vernacular tradition, it is a select few, the clergy, who appear to control wisdom‟s release 
with authority from God. 
 On first reading, The Metrical Epilogue appears merely to echo familiar classical 
and biblical images of flowing water or “aqua viva.”48 Some of the first lines of the work, 
for instance, are rooted in John 7:38. The Old English reads:  
 He cwæð ðæt he wolde     ðæt on worulde forð 
 of ðæm innoðum     a libbendu 
 wætru fleowen,     ðe wel on hine 
 gelifden under lyfte.
49
  
                                                 
48
 Hays, “Flumen orationis,” pp. 18-26 discusses the traditional echoes. 
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These lines paraphrase the verse from John which states: “qui credit in me sicut dixit 
scriptura flumina de ventre eius fluent aquae vivae.”50 This clear reference to the flowing 
waters common in the Bible has the potential to obscure the prevailing focus of this 
work: containment.
51
 Throughout the poem there is deep concern unparalleled in the 
Bible with holding and guarding this water. With all its connections to preceding Latin 
literature, this short poem displays adaptations of antique metaphors that cast light on an 
Anglo-Saxon ethics of wisdom. Like the Prose Preface to the Pastoral Care that T. A. 
Shippey links with a particular vernacular maxim, The Metrical Epilogue appears formed 
around modified maxims equating wisdom with treasure.
52
  Here water rather than 
treasure stands for wisdom. While the more traditional metaphor has been adapted, the 
emphasis on containing the precious substance, be it water or treasure, remains. This 
water is not from an earthly well but springs forth from the Holy Ghost and is wisdom. 
The importance of maintaining control of this water is evident in its transmission: 
 Ðonan hine hlodan     halge and gecorene, 
 siððan hine gierdon     ða ðe gode herdon 
 ðurh halga bec      hider on eorðan 
                                                                                                                                                 
49
 “Alfred‟s Metrical Epilogue to the Pastoral Care,” in The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems, ed. Dobbie, p. 111, 
lines 3-6: “He said that He desired that water should flow forth into the world from the bellies of those who 
well believed in him under the sky.”  
50
 “He who believes in me, as the scripture says, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water.” This debt 
was first recognized by A. S. Cook, Biblical Quotations in Old English Prose Writers (London, 1898), 42. 
This information was forgotten until Cross, “Metrical Epilogue,” p. 384, reintroduced it more than sixty 
years later. 
51
 For a discussion of water imagery in the Bible and a brief historical overview of exegesis surrounding 
John 7:38, see Whobrey, “King Alfred‟s Metrical Epilogue,” pp. 166-7. Whobrey discusses two conflicting 
traditions of interpretation that existed on this passage with the “living water” either flowing from the 
believer or from Christ. The former, proposed by Origen, seems to have been the accepted interpretation in 
the Middle Ages. 
52
 Shippey, “Wealth and Wisdom,” p. 353. In his article Shippey discusses the proverb ascribed to Alfred 
“„þus queþ Alured./ Wyþ-vte wysdome/ is weole wel unwurþ‟”: “Thus said Alfred, wealth without wisdom 
is worthless.” Rather than an original coinage of Alfred this proverb represents a saying that “could have 
been in existence from time immemorial, waiting for Alfred to seize on it and make it the groundwork of 
his first and most original literary venture.”  
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 geond manna mod     missenlice.
53
 
 
The “holy and chosen” draw from the well and adorn what they have heard from God. 
What they have then prepared now goes among the minds of men in a book. At no point 
in this process is the water representing wisdom allowed to be free. Though it flows, it 
flows between vessels. It is either held in the “holy and chosen” or set in a book. The 
necessity of containing this valuable “wisdomes stream” (stream of wisdom) is reinforced 
with an example of the contrasting ways that the stream can be used. It can either be held 
or released. Far better is to hold this stream:  
Sume hine weriað     on gewitlocan, 
 Wisdomes stream,     welerum gehæftað, 
 ðæt he on unnyt     ut ne tofloweð. 
 Ac se wæl wunað     on weres breostum 
ðurh dryhtnes giefe     diop and stille.
54
  
 
This passage clearly praises the containment of wisdom. Wisdom, the stream, must be 
guarded or it can flow out, becoming useless. Once again the body is the container with 
the lips acting as the seal preventing this precious liquid from being spilt. The 
containment is implicitly praised since the well becomes “deep and still” only “through 
the gift of God.” It strains credulity to imagine that in a Christian context a gift from God 
is ever supposed to be wasted.
55
 In this context, it can only be a good thing when this well 
is held in “the breast of the man.”  
                                                 
53
 “Alfred‟s Metrical Epilogue to the Pastoral Care,” ed. Dobbie, p. 111, lines 9-12: “Then the holy and 
chosen drew it (from the well); afterwards they directed it, those who obeyed God, through the holy books 
to this place on earth among minds of men in various ways.”  
54
 Ibid., lines 13-17: “Some guard the stream of wisdom in their enclosures of the mind, hold it with lips so 
that it does not flow out uselessly. Instead, the well remains deep and still in the breast of the man through 
the gift of God.” 
55
 Whobrey, “King Alfred‟s Metrical Epilogue,” pp. 179-182, finds correlating sentiments expressed in Prv 
18:4 as well as in Gregory‟s Regula pastoralis. Wisdom, always equated with water, should be stored so 
that it is “aqua profunda” (deep water). Weber makes a marginal note of correspondence between Prv 18:4 
and 20:5, which Whobrey seems to have overlooked: “sicut aqua profunda sic consilium  in corde viri sed 
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Of course, not all can recognize the value of what they receive. The next few lines 
are concerned with the consequences of carelessness with the “stream of wisdom,” that 
gift from God: 
 Sume hine lætað     ofer landscare 
 riðum torinnan ;     nis ðæt rædlic ðing, 
 tofloweð æfter feldum     oð hit to fenne werð.
56
  
 
Here is some of the clearest possible support for the necessity of containing the “stream 
of wisdom.” Those who allow this precious commodity to be wasted flowing away in 
streams across the land are chastised as unwise. The water must be held within, not 
allowed to escape. The idea of containment is further elaborated with the imagery of 
fields. Fields in Anglo-Saxon England had boundaries clearly defined by both nature and 
man. Useful fields were sharply delineated from the wilderness and those of neighboring 
settlements.
57
 Not only was it essential to divide fields to determine which belonged to 
whom, but to resist the untamed forests and swamps that would press against this cleared 
land. In that sense, another layer of containment is added as the water should not be 
allowed to flow beyond the marked areas where it will be useful. This pure water must be 
held and turned to good purpose, not permitted to run off into the useless tracts, the 
swamps and fens. 
After the brief interlude of pastoral imagery, the attention returns to the personal 
containment of wisdom. The next few lines discuss how Gregory the Great has prepared 
                                                                                                                                                 
homo sapiens exhauriet illud”: “counsel in the heart of a man is like deep water but a wise man will draw it 
out.” 
56
 Ibid., pp. 14-21: “Some let it flow away over the landscape in streams; this is not a wise thing, if such 
pure water, noisy and shallow, flows over fields until it becomes a fen.”  
57
 For an extended discussion on boundaries, their establishment, and their significance see Hooke, The 
Landscape of Anglo-Saxon England. Unwin, “Model of Anglo-Scandinavian Rural Settlement” provides 
insight on reorganization of settlement patterns and their boundaries in pre-conquest England in the context 
of contemporary field systems in Germany and Scandinavia. Whobrey, “King Alfred‟s Metrical Epilogue,” 
p. 185, reminds his reader of Alfred‟s familiarity with and probable dislike of swamps such as the fens of 
Somerset in which he hid from the Vikings during 877.  
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the well of God, again the stream of wisdom, and brought it to his readers‟ very door. 
Within these lines the transmission of wisdom once more takes place only between 
secure containers. From person, to book, to person, the water of wisdom is never released 
at all. Instead, it is transported. The final lines of the poem especially emphasize the 
importance of secure containers for wisdom: 
 Fylle nu his fætels,     se ðe fæstne hider 
 kylle brohte,     cume eft hræðe. 
 Gif her ðegna hwelc     ðyrelne kylle 
 brohte to ðys burnan,     bete hine georne, 
 ðy læs he forsceade      scirost wætra, 
 oððe him lifes drync     forloren weorðe.
58
 
 
Those with secure vessels and only those are told to come often to the well of God. The 
secure vessel is alone trusted to carry the stream of wisdom. Conversely, a punctured 
vessel must be mended or grave things will occur. The owner of an insecure enclosure 
could “scatter the clearest of waters,” a line recalling the metaphor of field and fen where 
water becomes diluted and useless. Nowhere is it said that this precious substance should 
be dispersed in the hope that someone will absorb a drop. Quite to the contrary, it is only 
in “prepared” and contained book form that this wisdom is allowed to circulate and, even 
then, it can only be shared out to those who have secure vessels to receive it.  
In a recent article Britt Mize also examines this short poem and appears to agree 
with the emphasis on containing the water through the first lines of the text: 
The saints and elect have drawn from this water source, and those primary 
recipients have directed the flow into the world by means of books, so that others 
can partake of it. These latter-day, secondary recipients, once they have the living 
water, manage it variously.
59
 
                                                 
58
 “Alfred‟s Metrical Epilogue to the Pastoral Care,” ed. Dobbie, p. 111, lines 25-30: “Let him fill now his 
vessel, he who brought a secure vessel here; let him come often to this place. If any follower brought a 
punctured vessel to this well, let him fix that lest he scatter the clearest of waters or the drink of life be 
destroyed for him.” 
59
 Mize, “Manipulations of the Mind-as-container Motif,” p. 48. 
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The “stream of wisdom” is again seen moving from one secure source to another under 
the direction of those “holy and chosen.” The path between containers is once more 
outlined. This water moves from the “holy and chosen,” to books, and then to its readers 
pouring only between closed vessels. Mize, however, does not see the poem as 
emphasizing enclosure, arguing that Alfred is following the “example of Gregory and 
other fathers” by allowing wisdom to flow out to the people.60 Citing as support lines 18-
19a,“„hine lætað / ofer landscare riðum torinnan‟ (they allow it to run all over the country 
in streams),” Mize builds his argument that “Alfred does not say that it is imprudent for 
teachers, preachers, and writers to release wisdom in streams running across the land, as 
some have interpreted lines 18-21.”61 Identifying what he calls an “ethics of reception,” 
Mize argues that it is permissible for the water to be released, with responsibility for its 
proper use resting both with those who have released it and with those supposed to 
receive it.
62
  
While some elements of the poem may be supposed to advocate this stance, as a 
whole the work appears to discourage the release of water. Were Mize working within 
the system commonly found in heroic poetry where thought equals treasure, as he does so 
well elsewhere, then his argument for release would be correct.
63
 As the final lines of the 
poem show, however, the work has moved outside of the heroic world and the metaphor 
has changed. The last six lines of the poem compose a modified maxim; these lines fit all 
                                                 
60
 Ibid., p. 49. 
61
 Ibid., p. 52. 
62
 Ibid., p. 51. 
63
 Though not his main focus, Mize discusses the equation of thought with treasure in heroic poetry in two 
of his articles: “Manipulations of the Mind-as-container Motif” and “Representation of the Mind.” For 
other discussion of the heroic mind see Harbus, The Life of the Mind, pp. 161-182 and Matto, “A War of 
Containment.”  
                                                                                                                                 Webb 29 
of the basic rules for a maxim put forth by Paul Cavill.
 64
 It seems that the author of the 
poem has simultaneously adapted both the vernacular metaphor of wisdom as treasure 
and the form of the Old English maxim to his needs. Because of these modifications, the 
poem is seated firmly outside the heroic system. While Mize argues quite correctly that it 
is a good thing to have water brought “from the heavenly wellspring „to durum 
iowrum‟(to your doors),” this water does not flow unattended to a person‟s dwelling. 
Instead, the water follows a course between secured vessels. When it comes “to durum 
iowrum” the stream is contained in a book and is, in fact, called a well. This description 
of the book as a well links it to that of the man who holds wisdom inside until it becomes 
“deep and still” very much like the water in a well. It is, then, closed sources of wisdom 
that are valued. The book which holds the water, not a running stream, arrives at a 
person‟s door. As J. E. Cross notes: “it is Gregory who channels the „spring of the Lord‟ 
through his book, and readers may drink „the clearest of waters‟. . . if their containers are 
fæst.”65 Indeed, the second half of the line 19 contradicts the argument that water should 
be allowed to flow freely. Those who let water run over the landscape are explicitly 
labeled as unwise. 
 With the focus of The Metrical Epilogue established, there is some concern that 
this shorter work is simply parroting motifs found in Latinate literature. Though there are 
commonalities between the Pastoral Care and The Metrical Epilogue, the poem does 
much more than blandly repeat old themes.
 66
 The Metrical Epilogue displays a depth of 
                                                 
64
 Cavill, Maxims in Old English Poetry, pp. 50-52. According to Cavill, the following are the defining 
features of a gnome or maxim: the elements of a complete sentence, superlatives—when used—lacking an 
explicit base of comparison, a present tense main verb, a subject that is not a specific person, and no deictic 
reference to a specific situation.  
65
 Cross, “Metrical Epilogue,” p. 386.   
66
 Whobrey, “King Alfred‟s Metrical Epilogue,” pp. 179-183. 
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metaphorical elaboration that reaches far beyond its possible sources. Allen Frantzen‟s 
work on prefaces shows that their use “implies the need for a supplement to the text” 
explaining the larger work.
67
 The Metrical Epilogue is operating in a similar capacity to 
one of Frantzen‟s prefaces; positioned at the end of the work, this poem provides a final 
chance to instill a message in the reader. Thus, while either a biblical source or a passage 
from the Regula pastoralis can be matched with almost every passage in the epilogue, 
this does not detract from the distinctly vernacular concepts expressed within it. There are 
so many potential antecedents that it is impossible to select any single one as the source 
governing the overarching metaphor of containment in the poem. The biblical passages, 
while parallel, consist of one or two lines scattered between volumes of writing which do 
not encompass the metaphorical depth that the poem reaches. Though many possible 
sources exist, none of them demonstrates either the length or consistent concern with 
control exemplified in The Metrical Epilogue. Yet, while the poem is not dominated by 
the Pastoral Care, there are common themes in the two works. The central concern with 
containment addressed in the poem appears in the larger prose text. In contrast with The 
Metrical Epilogue, however, information about vernacular beliefs does not exist in the 
form of blunt statements and assertions. Instead, it is the changes made to the Regula 
pastoralis during translation that indicate the cultural logic governing mental enclosures. 
In some instances these changes are almost trivial; in others they are elaborate 
modifications that reveal the model of mental containment. 
One place in which discrepancies between the intended meanings of the two texts 
are evident is in chapter twenty-two of the Old English version. This passage begins with 
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a quotation from Isaiah. The full quotation, as it is written in the Vulgate, is an injunction 
ordering those who carry the vessels of the Lord to be clean: “recedite recedite exite inde, 
pollutum nolite tangere, exite de medio eius, mundamini qui fertis vasa Domini.”68 In the 
Vulgate these vessels are physical dishes of gold or silver from the Lord‟s temple. 69 By 
placing these dishes as elements of the Lord‟s temple, these lines from Isaiah are 
developing their symbolic significance. The translated passage makes a similar 
movement towards endowing these vessels with symbolic meaning. In Old English, 
however, the container image carries much different implications, as we have seen in The 
Metrical Epilogue. The first lines of the Old English prose passage are strongly 
reminiscent of the end of The Metrical Epilogue where the vessels represent a person‟s 
individual mental enclosure capable of containing wisdom. This imagery of mental 
containment is reinforced through the word choice in the Pastoral Care: 
Forðæm wæs ðurh ðone witgan gecweden: Doð eow clæne, ge þe berað Godes 
fatu. Đa ðonne berað Godes fatu, ða þe oðerra monna saula underfooð to lædonne 
on ða triowa hiera agenra geearnunga to ðæm innemestan halignessum.
70
 
 
In both this passage and The Metrical Epilogue the mental enclosures are described as 
fatu. Yet, while the end of The Metrical Epilogue served in part as an enjoinder for 
people to make their enclosures secure, within the Pastoral Care the imagery is of 
already secure containers being transported by priests. In the context of The Metrical 
Epilogue, these secure containers appear to carry moral significance. It is not the leaky or 
unfit vessels that are carried to the “innemestan halignessum,” but those already fixed and 
                                                 
68
 Is 52:11: “Depart, Depart, Go from that place. Refuse to touch unclean things. Go from the midst of her. 
Be clean you who carry the vessels of the Lord.”  
69
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secured. The passage in the prose Pastoral Care strengthens the idea seen throughout the 
text and in The Metrical Epilogue that weak vessels are morally flawed and unworthy of 
containing wisdom. Only those secured are to be carried to the highest good: God.
71
 
Significant as well is the place to which these vessels are conveyed. “Innemestan 
halignessum” refers literally to the sanctuary of the tabernacle and holds connotations of 
spatial containment. These vessels are not taken simply anywhere; they are transported to 
the most central and secure place in the tabernacle, a place surrounded by numerous 
barriers and which a select few alone may enter. The secure containers are only moved 
into a secure area, reinforcing the message that nothing should escape from them.
72
 This 
parallels not only the idea of containment expressed in The Metrical Epilogue that 
insecure vessels are bad and should not be used, but also strengthens the conceit that the 
natural state of wisdom is to be tightly controlled. 
In the next few lines, attention shifts from the vessels being carried to the mental 
enclosures of those bearing the burden. The priests, since they bear the weighty 
responsibility of guiding souls to God, have reason to consider their own worthiness and 
to fear failure:   
Geðencen hie ðonne betweoh him selfum hu swiðe hie sculon beon geclænsode 
ða þe berað on hiera greadum ða a libbendan fatu to ðæm ecean temple on hiera 
agenre borg.
73
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So heavy is their duty that individual meditation is not enough. They must think 
“betweoh him selfum” (among themselves).74 In Old English, this three-word phrase 
indicates an action engaged in by multiple people, a communal effort. In Gregory‟s 
Regula pastoralis, the corresponding section reads, “apud semetipsos ergo quantum 
debeant mundari conspiciunt [var. conspiciant].”75 As a gloss to the Latin phrase “apud 
semetipsos” that it was meant to translate, the Old English phrase is inaccurate. The Latin 
idiom, in fact, means “to themselves” and represents much more an act of internal, 
individual reflection. With the Old English modification, the emphasis shifts from the 
internalization of thought to its externalization. In this passage priests are required to 
examine their possible faults, to reveal their own weaknesses, in an effort to rectify them. 
In a process of sharing much like the one urged in the opening lines of Maxims I, priests 
increase their wisdom, growing through the knowledge of their own imperfections.
76
 It is 
possible that this change is simply the fault of confusion during translation. The 
modification, however, appears to fit the overarching pattern seen in what I am calling 
the vernacular tradition: namely, that the mental enclosure can be opened for the 
betterment of wisdom. This instance is a combination of genial and didactic exhanges 
seen before. Priests voluntarily open their minds in order to grow in wisdom together and 
teach each other. In that vernacular context, this small change becomes indicative of the 
pattern seen across texts and, consequently, gains importance. Here, as in other texts, 
opening the mental enclosure is morally permissible if it increases wisdom. 
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 Continuing to provide insight into vernacular beliefs, the lines following the 
directive for priests to be clean supply a possible reason for these priests to fear failure 
and require improvement through personal disclosure. They are guiding the souls of their 
flock to God. This is the heaviest of responsibilities and, since they are undertaking it “on 
hiera agenre borg” (on their own pledge), they stand to bear the burden should they fall 
into error. The possible consequences appear to have inspired such fear that the priest 
was thought to be in danger of having his mental container overwhelmed:  
Forðy wæs ðurh þa halgan stemne beboden ðætte on Arones breostum sceolde 
beon awriten sio racu ðæs domes on ðæm hrægle þe mon hæt rationale, & mid 
nostlum gebunden, forðæm ðætte sio oferflownes ðara geðohta ne meahte ofsittan 
þæs sacerdes heortan, ac hio sceolde beon gebunden mid ðære ilcan race, ðætte 
he ne ðohte naht ungesceadwislices ne unnytlices.
77
 
 
The priest is in danger of having his heart oppressed by “oferflownes ðara geðohta” 
(superfluity of thoughts).
78
 The idea is that an excessive amount of thought, or, given the 
possibly emotive aspect of wisdom, emotion caused by thought could overpower the 
priest‟s mental faculties. So forceful could this “superfluity of thoughts” be that the priest 
has the “racu ðæs domes” (account of judgment) as an aid. What is given in the Old 
English Pastoral Care as an “account of judgment” has gone through two 
transformations before arriving at this point. 
 The origin of the “racu ðæs domes” is in a translation of rationale, the name given 
by the Vulgate for an article of priestly attire. This item was set with twelve stones, each 
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bearing the name of one of the twelve tribes, and held the two stones Urim and 
Thummim, understood by the Vulgate translator as “doctrine” and “truth.” It sounds as 
though the rationale is secured over the breast with gold chains so that Aaron can bear 
the “judgment of the sons of Israel”: 
 Pones autem in rationali iudicii doctrinam et veritatem quae erunt in pectore 
Aaron quando ingreditur coram Domino et gestabit iudicium filiorum Israhel in 
pectore suo in conspectu Domini semper.
79
 
 
The Vulgate defines the rationale as only a physical object. At the same time, it is 
invested with symbolic significance by simultaneously holding doctrine, truth, and the 
judgment of the sons of Israel. While not explicitly allegorized in the Vulgate, the 
rationale appears to function, in medieval understanding, as a reminder to lead an upright 
life following the doctrine of the church and God‟s truth. In his Regula pastoralis 
Gregory transforms this article of clothing intended as a reminder to live according to 
biblical standards into an allegory. This allegory depends on a pun made between the 
priestly robe rationale and ratio as a reminder that the priest should use reason:  
 Hinc diuina uoce praecipitur, ut in Aaron pectore rationale iudicii uittis ligantibus 
imprimatur, quatinus sacerdotale cor nequaquam cogitationes fluxae possideant, 
sed ratio sola constringat.
80
 
 
In the Latin, the “rationale iudicii” is a symbolic reminder to use reason. This means 
more than to use logic in decisions or thought. In providing a cue to use ratio, Gregory is 
calling on the Latin tradition in which the higher rational nature is opposed to carnal 
appetites. By utilizing this tradition Gregory extends his allegory beyond enjoining 
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priests to use reason and reminds them also to disdain pleasures of the flesh. In the Latin 
the rationale is attached to Aaron‟s breast just as it is in the Old English translation. The 
two key differences between the texts are the rendering of “rationale iudicii” and the 
absence in the Old English translation of Gregory‟s final Latin clause concerning reason. 
These changes transform the passage from an allegorical reminder to use reason to an 
elaboration of the vernacular concept of mental enclosure. A clear indication that the 
Pastoral Care has moved away from Gregory‟s allegorical interpretation is the division 
of “rationale iudicii” into two things: “sio racu ðæs domes” accompanied by the 
explanation “on ðæm hrægle þe mon hæt rationale.” Suddenly there are two entities, the 
account of judgment, and the robe that is called “rationale.” Translated in this manner, 
the focus of Gregory‟s allegory is lost.  
 While connecting itself with the vernacular tradition of mental enclosure, this 
passage elaborates the theme in a distinct way. More than reinforcing the importance of 
controlling wisdom so prevalent in The Metrical Epilogue, this section of the Pastoral 
Care strengthens and expands upon the concept of sharing thought to increase wisdom, a 
concept prevalent, as I have shown, in wisdom literature. The choice of racu to stand for 
rationale alters the meaning of this passage on a basic level. Appearing in only one other 
passage in the Pastoral Care, the semantic range of racu in this text indicates that it was 
understood as reasoning or an argument. This use of racu is supported by the dictionary 
definition and moves the “account of judgment” further from its interpretation as a 
reminder to use reason.
81
 Instead, the “rationale iudicii” appears to have been perceived 
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as an account of judgment.
82
 It seems important to the Anglo-Saxons to have the 
reasoning behind a decision. To a culture where wisdom, thought itself, has a communal 
aspect an unsupported statement lacks credence. The reasoning behind a decision is 
important perhaps so that it can be checked and better understood. The “racu ðæs domes” 
is conceivably a transcript of God‟s “witan,” the debate explaining the decisions of the 
final Judgment. Thoroughly transformed during the Old English “translation,” what was 
the “rationale iudicii” also contains the “oferflownes ðara geðohta” (superfluity of 
thoughts). Whether acting as a force itself or as a reminder for control, this newly 
fashioned entity marks the cultural ethics of mental containment. 
 Though The Metrical Epilogue urges a stringent control of wisdom and the prose 
passage discussed above argues for a conditional release of thought, both demonstrate 
that containment is the natural state of thought. The two sections emphasize their points 
by drawing on vernacular concepts: The Metrical Epilogue, the writer‟s last word, 
concludes with a modified form of the thought-as-treasure metaphor, while the prose 
passage is subtly altered to foreground vernacular beliefs. Yet the Old English sections 
examined go beyond adapting existing tropes or changing a text in translation. More than 
exemplify the rules of thought transfer, these sections appear to co-opt the clergy as an 
elite group controlling the ethics of mental containment. In The Metrical Epilogue the 
line of authority is clear. With God as the highest power, the “holy and chosen” direct 
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wisdom and bind it in a written form that they, as the educated elite, control.
83
 Likewise, 
in the prose passage from the Pastoral Care the priests compose the group that, while 
allowed to share thoughts, speak them only to each other. These texts represent a 
refiguring of the vernacular wisdom tradition along hierarchical lines. In the process of 
containing thought, the wise men of the vernacular tradition are supplanted by the clergy 
as the moderators of the ethics of containment. 
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The “Latinate” Tradition II: 
An Anglo-Saxon Ecclesiastical Wisdom 
 If The Metrical Epilogue to the Pastoral Care and the prose passage from the 
Pastoral Care itself represent a bridge between the wise men of vernacular literature who 
control thought and the clergy who attempt to assume that control, then the writings of 
Ælfric display a tradition in which not just the clergy, but an elite group of clergy, control 
the definition of correct and incorrect wisdom. More forcefully than any text or author 
considered above, Ælfric asserts his prerogative as a clergyman trained to the highest 
standards at Winchester to determine the validity of other texts and the amount of 
knowledge suitable to place in the minds of others. The importance that Ælfric places on 
establishing his own credibility manifests itself in the numerous different techniques that 
he employs.  
 Much as the author of the Metrical Epilogue places himself and the Pastoral Care 
in a chain of spiritual authority, Ælfric displays a recurrent desire to place his education, 
and by extension the works he produces, in a reputable context. As many scholars have 
noted, the prefaces to Ælfric‟s texts often include some reference to the schooling he 
received at Winchester under Æthelwold.
84
 This learned genealogy enforces Ælfric‟s own 
ability to discern correct teachings from incorrect. Ælfric does not stop at invoking his 
clerical history, however. He also directs attention to his powerful secular patrons. In this 
way Ælfric gains the weight of worldly authority to influence those swayed more by 
temporal power than by clerical prestige. Finally, Ælfric even attempts to establish the 
validity of his works through his own name. While to a modern reader this may seem 
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normal to the point of insignificance, the rarity with which medieval texts are attributed 
to, or claimed by, a named person lends this act special significance. Ælfric was using 
every technique at his disposal to enhance the correctness of his own works. The Old 
English preface to Ælfric‟s First Series of Catholic Homilies simultaneously displays 
these different methods for establishing authority:   
Ic, Ælfric, munuc and mæsspreost, swa ðeah waccre þonne swilcum hadum 
gebyrige, wearð asend on Æþelredes dæge cyninges from Ælfeage biscope, 
Æðelwoldes æftergengan, to sumum mynstre ðe is Cernel gehaten þurh 
Æðelmæres bene ðæs þegenes, his goodnys sind gehwær cuðe.
85
 
 
First Ælfric establishes his personal credentials; he is a “munuc and mæsspreost” (monk 
and mass-priest). By stating these two positions, Ælfric is giving the reader an indication 
of the knowledge he holds both as a person educated by monks, the most learned group at 
that time in England, and as someone who received training as a preacher. After 
connecting his name with those two positions, Ælfric demonstrates his relationship to 
Winchester where he was educated with a reference to “Ælfeage biscope, Æðelwoldes 
æftergengan” (Bishop Ælfheah, the successor of Æthelwold).86 In affirming his 
connection to Winchester, a center of education, Ælfric is indicating even greater learning 
than the average monk or priest would have received and thus building his own authority. 
Ælfric‟s final strategy is to place himself under the protection of a powerful thegn, 
Æthelweard. It is at this thegn‟s request that Ælfric is moved to Cerne. With such a 
prestigious patron Ælfric has much less need to worry about his works offending, and in 
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his preface, Ælfric is revealing his secure position to his readers.
 87
  Ælfric, by associating 
himself with traditionally educated positions, a center of education, and an influential 
secular lord creates a powerful position for himself as an educated authority with 
protected status.
88
  
 It is vital for Ælfric to place himself within a secure chain of authority because he 
perceives a great need for correction in vernacular works. While Alfred, whom Ælfric 
references with approval, was seen in the tenth and eleventh centuries as having carried 
out a significant amount of translation into the vernacular, he did not share all the same 
concerns as Ælfric. As Godden notes, the translation of Boethius‟ De consolatione 
philosophiae supposedly done by Alfred “was itself seen by contemporaries as a 
heterodox work with some extremely questionable antique ideas.”89 The translation of 
Boethius, as well as the free additions made to the translation of Augustine‟s Soliloquies, 
shows a much less strenuous adherence to written authority. Thus, while Ælfric praises 
the works that he attributes to Alfred, he himself possesses a far more rigorous idea of 
orthodoxy than was displayed in writings before his own.
90
 Much to Ælfric‟s apparent 
chagrin, however, Alfred‟s translation project seems to have at least indirectly inspired 
the translations of other works that were either heterodox or translated so poorly that they 
misled readers. It is these fallacious texts that Ælfric condemns:  
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Đa bearn me on mode, ic truwige ðurh godes gife, þæt ic ðas boc of ledenum 
gereorde to engliscre spreæce awende, na þurh gebylde micelre lare, ac for ðan ðe 
ic geseah and gehyrde mycel gedwyld on manegum engliscum bocum ðe 
ungelærde menn ðurh heora bilewitnysse to micclum wisdome tealdon. And me 
ofhreow þæt hi ne cuðon næfdon ða godspellican lare on heora gewritum, buton 
ðam mannum anum ðe þæt leden cuðon and buton þam bocum ðe Alfred cyning 
snoterlice awende of ledene on englisc.
91
 
 
Here Ælfric, having already established his education and authority, engages in a short 
polemic against the “gedwyld” (error) in books written in English. Though he does not 
specify which books he means, it is probable that Ælfric is referencing texts without a 
specific tradition to give them credence. As Nancy Thompson convincingly demonstrates 
with Ælfric‟s translation of the apocryphal Acts of Peter, Ælfric trusted tradition much in 
the same way that his contemporaries did and “tended to believe what he read.” 92 Ælfric, 
then, must be referring to texts that he views as lacking an authoritative tradition of 
acceptance, though this body of works is still undefined. A problematic dichotomy 
between theory and practice is created by Ælfric‟s own acceptance of tradition. In 
practice, it appears as though Ælfric uses written tradition as his standard. At the same 
time, he condemns other people‟s acceptance of written information that, as written word, 
they perceive as authoritative. This problem is, in part, why it was so important for Ælfric 
to establish his education. As books were becoming increasingly common and providing 
different potential sources of „tradition,‟ Ælfric was placing himself as the gatekeeper to 
correct knowledge. The importance of disseminating only correct information is revealed 
by Ælfric‟s conceit of the mind.   
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 As the preface states, unlearned men were accepting fallacies through their 
“bilewitnysse” (ignorance). Rather than the positive connotations of moral purity or 
ignorance of evil sometimes associated with the word, here “bilewitnysse” carries a 
pejorative sense; men are accepting what they read because they are simply too stupid to 
know better.
 93
 They do not have the discretion or mental acuity to filter out the errors in 
what they hear or learn, but rather blindly take the information that is given to them. In a 
sense, then, the minds of the unlearned are very similar to the mental vessels of the 
Metrical Epilogue and The Pastoral Care discussed above. The capacity, or ability, of 
each mind is, to Ælfric, fixed:  
We rædað nu æt godes ðenungum be ðan eadigan were Iob. Nu wille we eow 
hwæt lytles be him gereccan for ðan þe seo deopnys ðære race / oferstihð ure 
andgit and eac swiðor þæra ungelæredra. Man sceal læwedum mannum secgan be 
heora andgites mæðe swa þæt hi ne beon ðurh ða deopnysse æmode ne ðurh ða 
langsumnysse geæðrytte.
94
 
 
This narrative about Job “oferstihð” (exceeds) the understanding “þæra ungelæredra” (of 
the unlearned). The idea implicit in this passage is that the minds of the laypeople do not 
have the capacity to absorb all of the information about Job.
95
 Even if Ælfric were to 
attempt a complete explication of the book, his audience would become “æmode” 
(disheartened) and “geæðrytte” (wearied) from the explication‟s depth and length. The 
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spatial terms used to describe the minds of the laypeople are themselves indicative of 
Ælfric‟s understanding of the mind; like something tangible, the mind described here has 
a limited amount of space that can be exceeded.
96
 The concept of human understanding 
being exceeded and the spatial vocabulary used by Ælfric to describe the mind seem to 
parallel a passage from the Pastoral Care. Towards the end of the Pastoral Care wheat is 
used as an allegory for words which have the potential to overwhelm the shallow mind: 
“ðylæs hira mon má geote on ðæt úndiope mod ðonne hit behabban mæg, ðæt hi ðon 
oferflowe.”97Ælfric, whose writings echo the Pastoral Care in other places as well, ties 
himself into the tradition of conceptualizing the mind as something with a limited, spatial 
capacity.
98
 Through his works, Ælfric is attempting to fill the space of unlearned minds 
with just the right amount of orthodox thought. These minds must be filled both to 
prevent error on their part and because their owners have a specific role to fill in the 
scheme of evangelism.  
 To Ælfric, it appears that the active life was the most desirable. Mary Clayton 
finds that Ælfric devalues the eremitic life to the extent that he “seems to have 
deliberately refrained from presenting the life of the hermit as ideal.”99 Much more 
important than contemplation were good works. Ælfric himself embodies the emphasis 
on the active life filled with good works. In his homilies for Christians, his letters 
answering theological questions, his translations, and his crusade against the error he sees 
in other texts, Ælfric is every bit the active evangelist. At Cerne, where Ælfric composed 
the majority of his homilies, it is very likely that the monks provided pastoral care to the 
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community and shared with them a place of worship.
100
 This situation would have been a 
relative anomaly but, as Wilcox argues, would have become more common as the 
Benedictine reform progressed.
101
 This context places Ælfric in contact with many more 
souls than the monks of Cerne. If one imagines a chapel filled with both monks and 
laypeople, the circumstances surrounding Ælfric‟s emphasis on the active life become 
clearer. The fact that some laypeople would retire to monastic life must also be taken into 
account. 
 With people who had spent most of their lives outside of the church occupying 
positions as monks, the diversity of Ælfric‟s audience is almost assured. The presence of 
these former laypeople in the monastic setting could also help explain the content of 
those homilies of Ælfric that explicate tenets of the Christian faith seemingly too basic 
for the ears of lifelong monks. This simplified teaching further informs what appears to 
have been a larger view of laypeople‟s minds, held at least by the Winchester reform 
circle, that was similar to Ælfric‟s own opinions on the subject. Æthelwold, the teacher 
Ælfric so frequently references, believes much in the same vein as his student that the 
minds of laymen are of inferior quality. In his “Account of King Edgar‟s Establishment 
of Monasteries,” Æthelwold prefaces his discussion about laymen who join the church by 
stating that they, not scholars, require the following translation of the Benedictine 
Rule:
102
   
Is þeah niedbehefe ungelæredum woroldmonnum þe for helle wites ogan and for 
Cristes lufan þis earmfulle lif forlætaþ and to hyra Drihtne gecyrrað and þone 
halgan þeowdom þises regules geceosaþ; þy læs þe ænig ungecyrred woroldman 
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mid nytnesse and ungewitte regules geboda abræce and þære tale bruce þæt he þy 
dæge misfenge þy he hit selre nyste. Ic þonne geþeode to micclan gesceade 
telede. Wel mæg dugan hit naht mid hwylcan gereirde mon sy gestryned and to 
þan soþan geleafan, butan þæt an sy þæt he Gode gegange. Hæbban forþi þa 
ungelæreden inlendisce þæs halgan regules cyþþe þurh agenes gereordes 
anwrigenesse, þæt hy þe geornlicor Gode þeowien and nane tale næbben þæt hy 
þurh nytennesse misfon þurfen.
103
 
 
At the very heart of this passage is the idea that the minds of laymen are not able to able 
to understand what the learned scholars can. The translation is necessary for the 
“ungelæredum woroldmonnum” (unlearned laymen) about whom the passage speaks 
with a patronizing tone. These lay converts may fall into error with their “nytenesse and 
ungewitte” (ignorance and stupidity). This is not a case in which the secondary meanings 
belonging to either of these pejorative words provide a different interpretation. Nytenness 
primarily means “ignorance” but can also mean “laziness, disgrace, or ignominy.”104 
Similarly, ungewit carries the meanings of “madness, insanity” and “folly, stupidity.”105 
These two words, used in proximity to emphasize the point, leave no doubt that laymen, 
whether they become monks later in their lives or not, are thought to have lesser 
intelligence. So poor is the quality of mind in this lay population that Æthelwold is 
conceding the fact that they can not be expected to learn the Rule in Latin. Instead, he 
gives the “ungelæreden inlendisce” (unlearned natives) a translation to remove any 
excuse that they broke the rules through ignorance. Though this text is not one of 
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Ælfric‟s, it appears to express a conception of laypeople very like Ælfric‟s own: 
laypeople are stupid and inadequate, breaking rules and employing whatever excuse they 
can. Not only are these laypeople entirely inadequate, but they have infiltrated monastic 
ranks. With a mixed audience of monks, a retired semi-monastic lay population, and 
actual laypeople before him, it is no wonder that Ælfric felt a strong need to take action 
and correct errors that must have been, to him, painfully clear. There is also some 
evidence that Ælfric was exposed to laypeople beyond the context of village worship and 
pastoral care. 
 The third section of a letter written by Ælfric to an unknown “brother Edward” 
contains some indication that Ælfric ventured beyond the monastery walls: 
Ic bidde eac þe, broðor, forþam ðe þu byst uppan lande mid wimmannum oftor 
þonne ic beo, þæt þu him þing secge, gif ðu for scame swaþeah hit him secgan 
mæge.
106
 
 
The qualifier, “oftor þonne ic beo” (more often than I am), used in reference to Edward 
being in the country suggests that Ælfric himself ventured beyond the boundaries of 
Cerne. This qualifier could, of course, be intended by Ælfric as understatement meaning 
something along the lines of “you, Edward, tell them since I am never up country.”  In 
context of Ælfric‟s letter to Sigefyrth, however, with its reference to his becoming 
intoxicated while visiting, it appears that Ælfric was “up country” much more often than 
the Benedictine Rule would have prescribed.
107
 Together these references to time spent 
outside the monastery paint Ælfric as an active local traveler in contact with many 
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people. Ælfric‟s travels, in context with the mixed group of monks and laypeople whom 
he would have seen at church services, further illuminate the reasoning behind his 
emphasis on the active life over the contemplative one. Yet, while Ælfric certainly 
favored good works over the eremitical tradition, he did not assign the same duties to 
each group. 
 The beginnings of a system of labor division based on mental capacity appear in 
Ælfric‟s Hexameron. Here Ælfric outlines the responsibility of people with less mental 
acuity by contrast: 
 Đu scealt gelyfan     on ðone lifigendan God, 
 and na ofer ðine mæð     motian be him, 
 ðe læste ðu dwelige     swa swa to feala dydon 
 ðe ofer heora andgit     embe ðæt smeadon 
 buton geleafan     and forði losodon.
108
   
 
From this it is clear that Ælfric believes that it is not for everyone to ponder theological 
issues. Should someone delve too deeply without adequate “andgit” (understanding), they 
will be destroyed as many have been before. It is worth noting here that “andgit” is the 
same word that Ælfric used in the beginning of his homily on Job to describe the 
differing levels of comprehension between himself and the lay population. Ælfric‟s 
perception of the carefully ordered world places laypeople far from the realm of spiritual 
and mental inquiry. Rather than prejudice, this seems to represent the straightforward 
belief that these “simple” people did not posses the ability, the understanding, to carry out 
independent thought without error. No matter how simple Ælfric perceived the lay 
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population to be, he did assign them a role in God‟s overall design. Rather than advance 
theological thought, laypeople were to assure their favor with God by performing deeds: 
Ic secge þe to soðan þæt se bið swiþe wis, se þe mid weorcum spricð, and se hæfð 
forþgang for Gode and for worulde, se ðe mid godum weorcum hine sylfne 
geglengð.
109
 
 
Far different than the hermits who turn inward seeking a spiritual connection to God, the 
wise and successful person in Ælfric‟s world proves his worth through action. The 
actions of laymen held a specific benefit to the church, as Ælfric illustrates in his homily 
on the three servants who receive different amounts of money from their lord. To Ælfric 
the servants are rewarded according to their merit, with the servant who receives the most 
representing laymen. Ælfric foregrounds the importance of works in this story by 
doubling the money given to the layman because he teaches “other men about God 
through his good example”:110  
Se goda deowa þe ða fif pund underfeng gestrynde his hlaforde þærto oðre fif for 
ðan þe sume læwede men sind swa geworhte þæt hi, mid onbryrdnysse þæs 
upplican eðles, syllað gode bysne oðrum geleaffullum, and symle tæcað riht þæs 
ðe hi magon tocnawan be ðam yttrum andgitum, þeah ðe hi ne cunnon ða  
uncundan deopnysse Godes lare asmeagan. And ðonne hi on heora flæsclicum 
lustum gemetegode beoð, and on woruldlicum gewilnungum ne beoð to grædige, 
and eac oðrum unðeawum þurh Godes ege hi sylfe healdað, þonne styrað hi eac 
oðrum mannum ðurh heora lifes rihtwisnysse and gestrynað  Gode sumne oðerne 
mannan oððe ma. Se ðe swa deð se gebrincð Gode tyn pund of ðam fif yttrum 
andgitum þe he underfeng.
111
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Once again, it is through works, here figured as living a pious life, that the average 
person pleases God. These people give a god bysen (good example) and teach those laws 
of God that they are able to perceive with their limited minds. As members of a group 
who cannot think about the “uncundan deopnysse Godes lare” (the unknown depth of 
God‟s doctrine), the people discussed here are clearly considered by Ælfric as below him 
in intelligence. Nevertheless, these laypeople are important since they bring more souls to 
the church. Part of the continued survival of the church, then, depends on the actions of 
these laypeople. This dependence heightens Ælfric‟s interest in controlling what 
information the lay population receives by changing the stakes of that control.   
 Ælfric, as has been seen, views minds as vessels with fixed capacity. He also 
appears to believe that the minds of laypeople will take in any information given to them. 
Because this same unwary population helps determine the success of the church, it is vital 
for Ælfric to control the flow of information that reaches them. If he can provide them 
with orthodox teachings, then their actions will be correct and more people will come 
into the church‟s fold. The concern for control is the factor that drives Ælfric to 
vehemently establish his authority in his prefaces. It is also why the Old English prefaces 
to the First and Second Series of Catholic Homilies, the Grammar, the Translation of 
Genesis, and the Lives of Saints contain remarkably similar passages stressing the 
importance of exact copying from the exemplar. The strength of this concern to Ælfric is 
indicated by the final words of his preface to the First Series of Catholic Homilies:  
Nu bydde ic and halsige on Godes naman, gif hwa þas boc awritan wylle, þæt he 
hi geornlice gerihte be ðære bysene, þy læs ðe we ðurh gymelease writeras 
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geleahtrode beon. Mycel yfel deð se ðe leas writ, buton he hit gerihte, swylce he 
gebringe þa soðan lare to leasum gedwylde; forði sceal gehwa gerihtlæcan þæt 
þæt he ær to woge gebigde, gif he on Godes dome unscyldig beon wile.
112
 
 
Everything is just as Ælfric desires in the texts that he has produced. He has prepared 
them to fill the minds of the unlearned and any deviation from his orthodox teachings by 
“gymelease writeras” (careless writers) will cause great harm. Ælfric gives much thought 
to the accuracy of copying because once a manuscript is produced it becomes a repository 
of knowledge. A book is a vessel in and of itself carrying the wisdom entrusted to it and, 
orthodox or not, that wisdom has a high probability of being interpreted as authoritative. 
Even Ælfric has a tendency to give the written word uncritical acceptance.  
 While in many places Ælfric appears to thoroughly examine the tradition 
governing a text or story before giving it his approval, there are hints that even he is 
occasionally victim to the excessive faith in books that he derides elsewhere in his works: 
And se Halga Gast ða heora ealra mod þe ðærinne wæron, þæt sindon an hund 
manna and twentig manna swa onbryrde and onælde þæt hi cuðon ælc gereord þe 
on middanearde is, and hi ðurh ðone Halgan Gast ealle ða bec and ðone wisdom 
awriton and asetton ðe Godes þeowas rædað geond ealle ðas woruld.
113
     
 
This passage is highly indicative of Ælfric‟s perception of tradition. All of what were to 
be considered by Ælfric the correct books, began with instigation from God or part of the 
Trinity, here the Holy Ghost. Thus, any works that can establish a link to either a credible 
church father, an apostle, or a long standing literary tradition gain Ælfric‟s approval. 
These works he takes as incontrovertible fact, basing his translations and homilies on 
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them. When speaking about the Assumption of the Virgin, for instance, Ælfric makes it 
clear that the only valid information comes from divinely inspired works:  
Gif we mare secgað be ðisum symbeldæge þonne we on ðam halgum bocum 
rædað þe ðurh godes dihte gesette wæron, ðonne beo we ðam dwolmannum gelice 
þe be heora agenum dihte oððe be swefnum fela lease gesetnyssa awriton.
114
 
 
In contrast to the “dwolmannum” (heretics) who write books from their own thought or 
some vision, are the correct books sent from God. It is these holy books that Ælfric 
considers authoritative and which he claims as sources.  
In his trust that the written word contains wisdom, Ælfric is reflecting a much 
larger Anglo-Saxon belief. Sections of the Exeter Book depict beliefs very similar to 
Ælfric‟s own. The anonymous riddles contained in the Exeter book point to a conviction 
of the wisdom of books and their role as containers of wisdom extending far beyond 
Ælfric alone. Riddle 26, to which the answer is book or Bible, indicates the containment 
inherent in book form and advantage of the knowledge held: 
Mec siþþan wrah 
 hæleð hleobordum,     hyde beþenede, 
 gierede mec mid golde;     forþon me gliwedon 
 wrætlic weorc smiþa,     wire bifongen.
115
 
 
The emphasis in this passage begins with the use of the verb wreon (here “wrah”). On 
one level of interpretation this verb can simply mean “to cover.” The nature of riddles, 
however, is to invoke the multiple meanings of a word, or words, to concurrently confuse 
and enlighten the listener. As Fred Robinson has shown with Riddle 47, the implication 
of multiple meanings was a device consciously used, at the very least, by the individual 
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who composed Riddle 47 and, more probably, by many Anglo-Saxon poets.
116
 The 
intentional use of this device means that the reader must go beyond the primary meaning 
of a word and take into account the secondary or even tertiary definitions. The verb 
wreon, beyond its literal meaning of “to cover,” contains the ideas of protection and 
concealment.
117
 The next verb, beþennan (here “beþenede”), adds another level of 
binding, strengthening the idea of enclosure.
118
 Finally, the hero is said to have “gierede” 
(clothed) the book. With the further sense of “to make ready” inherent in this third verb, 
the idea that the book is not ready until it has been surrounded by multiple protective 
layers is added to the sentence as well as a third emphasis on containment.
119
 In the 
second sentence quoted above, the verb befon (here “bifongen”) carries a strong sense of 
enclosure.
120
 Together these verbs form a constellation of connotation. Their grouping 
together could not have been an accident. Rather, since these meanings must function as 
clues to the riddle‟s answer, the grouping must indicate the composer‟s perception that 
the knowledge held in a book, just as knowledge held in the mind, must—by its nature—
be contained. Taken together, the lexical evidence in this passage illustrates a positive 
conceit of the containment of wisdom within a book. Though Riddle 26 ends with an 
extended list detailing the benefits of reading, another riddle suggests what was one of 
Ælfric‟s greatest fears: a person may not understand what they read.  
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 Riddle 47, the “Bookworm” riddle, highlights the idea that someone can read 
without benefiting from the knowledge contained within a book. As Robinson explains in 
his discussion of the riddle, the fact that it begins with the answer hints that there is 
something more to it:
121
 
Moððe word fræt.     Me þæt þuhte  
wrætlicu wyrd,     þa ic þæt wundor gefrægn,  
þæt se wyrm forswealg     wera gied sumes,  
þeof in þystro,     þrymfæstne cwide  
ond þæs strangan staþol.     Stælgiest ne wæs 
wihte þy gleawra,     þe he þam wordum swealg.
122
 
 
While on a literal level the answer to this riddle of “bookworm” satisfies the given clues, 
the connotations once again direct the reader‟s attention to another level of interpretation. 
The statements that the worm “forswealg” (devoured) a man‟s sayings and that he 
“swealg” (swallowed) words are more than references to eating.123 The semantic range of 
the root verb encompasses figurative meanings of learning.
124
 If the riddle is interpreted 
on a figurative level, much as the proverbs and maxims above, then it is logical to assume 
that “wyrm” in line 3a is also being used figuratively. 125 When it is understood in this 
way, the riddle express disgust with someone who reads but does not learn. Implicit here 
is the assumption that a person who reads should gain wisdom. There is faith that what is 
in a book is necessarily good and that an individual should benefit from imbibing those 
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 Robinson, “Artful Ambiguities,” p. 356. 
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 Riddle 47, ed. Dobbie and Krapp, p. 205, lines 1-6: “A moth ate words. I thought that a curious fate, 
when I heard of that wonder, that the worm should devour a man‟s saying, a thief in the dark, an illustrious 
speech and something founded by a strong man. The thievish stranger was nothing the wiser, he who 
swallowed the words.” 
123
 Robinson, “Artful Ambiguities,” pp. 357-358.  
124
 An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Bosworth et al., s.v. swelgan sense II. “to take in to the mind, accept, 
imbibe (wisdom).”  
125
 An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, Bosworth et al., s.v. wyrm sense II. “Ic eam wyrm (vermis) and nales mon.”  
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contents.
126
 Conversely, it is possible for someone to “steal” or make improper use of 
wisdom, as the moth does here. The theft weakens wisdom by destroying a part of the 
vessel thereby keeping it from another‟s use. It is this cultural assumption that reading 
necessarily leads to wisdom, however, that makes Ælfric so concerned with the correct 
copying and transmission of his works. He knows that what is written will be interpreted 
as truth. Yet, as secure in his opinions as Ælfric appears, he must remain a single voice.   
 As multiple scholars have noted, the varying transmission of Ælfric‟s works 
displays that there were multiple strains of religious thought at the time. Ælfric‟s 
contemporaries appear not to have shared many of his attitudes. The repeated pleas 
Ælfric makes that his works remain unmixed with those of other authors often went 
unheeded. Possibly within his own lifetime, Ælfric‟s productions were mixed with those 
of anonymous homilists.
127
 The rigid orthodoxy that he attempts to project was ignored 
by some of Ælfric‟s contemporaries who, when producing manuscripts, freely mixed his 
works with apocrypha.
128
 Indeed, the inclusion of the Life of St. Mary of Egypt with 
Ælfric‟s Lives of Saints, which, as Hugh Magennis convincingly demonstrates, conflicts 
with many of Ælfric‟s views, hints that “the extent of the influence of his full message 
was a good deal more limited than he would have liked.”129 Moreover, if John Blair‟s 
assessment is correct that a great many localities in Anglo-Saxon England were 
associated with local saints, then it is logical that these cults must have produced vast 
                                                 
126
 Scattergood, “Eating the Book,” surveys analogies between the Old English metaphor of alimentary 
wisdom and Classical Latin, Old Irish, and Middle English metaphors of ingesting wisdom. He finds that 
the idea is not at all unique to the Anglo-Saxons and that the wyrm, from any perspective, is committing a 
wrongful act. 
127
 Wilcox, Ælfric’s Prefaces, pp. 34-35. 
128
 Thompson, “Anglo-Saxon Orthodoxy,” p. 60. 
129
 Magennis, “St. Mary of Egypt and Ælfric,” p.111. 
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amounts of unauthorized hagiography.
130
 Thus, a reader of Ælfrician texts must be 
cautious not to assume that this figure, who produced a monumental amount of literature, 
represents the beliefs of the entire Anglo-Saxon church. Instead, Ælfric represents only 
one of the groups vying for the control of wisdom in early-medieval England.  
 As a representative of this single group, however, Ælfric has very clear concepts 
of knowledge and the mind. As demonstrated above, Ælfric‟s obsessive attempts to 
control the transmission of his writings, as well as his denunciation of other works filled 
with „error,‟ indicate both his attitude that orthodox knowledge is objectively correct, and 
the belief that he is in a position to determine what is right. Discussions by Ælfric of 
laymen and their mental capacity indicate that the same view of mental containers—that 
they are vessels with fixed capacity—running through the Pastoral Care informs Ælfric‟s 
writings. Because Ælfric seems to believe that the laymen‟s minds will absorb any 
information without question, it is vitally important that he fill them with what he views 
as correct knowledge. Ælfric, then, attempts to take over the control of wisdom so that he 
can pass on the good and weed out the evil. More is at stake for Ælfric, however, than 
simply the control of wisdom. The very survival of the Christian church, to him, depends 
on the actions and beliefs of the laypeople. In turn, these actions depend on the Ælfric 
giving them the correct teachings. As a cautionary note, the fact that Ælfric‟s works were 
mixed with others in exactly the way that he did not want demonstrates the impossibility 
of maintaining control of knowledge in any form. This proves that Ælfric‟s beliefs were 
not at all the only ones held by members of the church at the time. It seems that Ælfric, 
though officially backed to some extent, was not the representative of the entire Anglo-
                                                 
130
 See Blair, “A Saint for Every Minster?,” for an extended examination of saints‟ cults in Anglo-Saxon 
England. Blair argues that there was a large number of local saints‟ cults, linking English practices with 
similar  
                                                                                                                                 Webb 57 
Saxon church. Consequently, he represents what is perhaps the most extreme strand of 
Benedictine reform. 
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Conclusion 
 Though ending with Ælfric‟s relatively extreme views, two larger ideas become 
apparent in the examination of the vernacular, moderate Latinate, and ecclesiastical 
Latinate, traditions above: all three permit the exchange of wisdom if it will lead to 
improvement, either personal or institutional; and all three illustrate that wisdom is 
contained in its natural state. While the authorities governing the ethics of exchange and 
their reasons for that exchange differ, these two main ideas permeate the works 
considered above.  
In the vernacular tradition, an elite group of exceptionally wise men control the 
cultural logic of wisdom‟s exchange. These men debated among themselves, elaborating 
on basic sayings to create higher wisdom. While they will teach the young, the emphasis 
on the taming and shaping of the unformed mind highlights the control inherent within 
the system of wisdom transfer. In both cases the exchanges take place for improvement. 
When wise men debate with each other, wisdom is improved. When they teach a young 
person, that individual is improved. The moderate Latinate tradition, represented by the 
translation of Gregory the Great‟s Regula pastoralis, marks a hierarchical shift in 
authority from local wise men to the clergy. These clergy, who bear the weighty 
responsibility of guiding others to God, disclose their innermost thoughts in order to 
improve themselves. Yet, as the changes made in the translation of the Regula pastoralis 
into Old English and the adaptation of traditional metaphors in The Metrical Epilogue to 
the Pastoral Care demonstrate, this tradition too places great value on containing 
thought. Finally, the ecclesiastical Latinate tradition, the most stringent example of 
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hierarchical control of wisdom, allows for a third case of sharing thoughts. Wisdom must 
fill laypeople‟s spatial minds so that they can strengthen the church. Wisdom is once 
more shared for the sake of improvement, but it is not shared immoderately. Only an 
exact amount of wisdom must fill the mind. Should there be too much, it will overflow 
the capacity of a layperson‟s mind and be lost. Should there be too little, there will be 
room in a layperson‟s mind for evil. Once more wisdom moves from different containers 
with an emphasis on control. Thus, while subtle differences exist between each of the 
identifiable authors and the various texts examined above, there were two watchwords in 
an Anglo-Saxon ethics of wisdom exchange. No matter the tradition, no matter the 
genera, these two concepts prevailed: control and improvement.  
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